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The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is part of the mentalizing network, a set
of brain regions consistently engaged in inferring mental states. However, its precise
function in this network remains unclear. It has recently been proposed that the dmPFC is
involved in high-level abstract (i.e., categorical) identification or construction of both social
and non-social stimuli, referred to as “high construal.” This was based on the observation
of greater activation in the dmPFC shared by a high construal social condition (trait
inference based on visually presented behavior) and a high construal non-social condition
(categorization of visually presented objects) vs. matched low construal conditions (visual
description of the same pictures). However, dmPFC activation has been related to
task contexts requiring responses based on self-guided generation of mental content
or decisions as compared to responses more directly determined by the experimental
context (e.g., free vs. rule-governed choice). The previously reported dmPFC activity may
reflect differences in task constraint (i.e., the extent to which the task context guided the
process) confounded with the construal manipulation. Therefore, in the present study, we
manipulated construal level and constraint independently, while participants underwent
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). As before, participants visually described
(low level construal) or categorized (high level construal) pictures of objects. Orthogonal
to this, the description or categorization task had to be performed on either one object
(low constraint) or on two objects simultaneously (high constraint), limiting the number of
possible responses. Statistical analysis revealed common greater activation in both high
construal conditions (high and low constraint) than in their low construal counterparts,
replicating the influence of construal level on dmPFC activation (greater involvement in
high than low construal), but no influence of constraint. In line with previous proposals
and earlier work, we suggest that the dmPFC is involved in high-construal abstraction
across different domains.
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INTRODUCTION
Inferring mental states of others consistently engages a number
of brain areas, collectively called the mentalizing network (Frith
and Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). Within
this mentalizing network, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
plays an essential role. While there is ample evidence that the
ventral part of the mPFC subserves affective processes (for
reviews, see e.g., Davidson and Irwin, 1999; Phan et al., 2002;
Quirk and Beer, 2006; Roy et al., 2012), the dorsal part of
the mPFC (dmPFC) appears to be involved in cognitively-
oriented mentalizing, entailing reflective, and hypothetical social
processing (see meta-analyses by Schilbach et al., 2012; Bzdok
et al., 2013; Schurz et al., 2014; Molenberghs et al., 2016).
Based on an extensive review, Van Overwalle (2011) concluded
that the mPFC is preferentially engaged in social cognition:
independent of the experimental task, activation of the mPFC
is proportional to the amount of mentalizing content in the
stimulus material (e.g., mental states such as goals of actions,
beliefs, moral (in)justice, personality traits, social categories, and
emotions). Nevertheless, several studies have reported activation
in the dmPFC (centered around Montreal Neurological Institute
coordinates 0, 50, 35 as specified by Van Overwalle and Baetens,
2009) without mentalizing content in the stimulus material (e.g.,
Goel et al., 1997; Ferstl and von Cramon, 2001, 2002; Grinband
et al., 2006; Siebörger et al., 2007; Rowe et al., 2008; Green
et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2010). Hence, it seems likely that the
dmPFC subserves an underlying process that is required in, but
not restricted to, social cognition. However, the precise nature
of this fundamental process remains unclear. The present study
investigates and compares two alternative explanations for this
underlying process in dmPFC activation: (a) the level of abstract
construal and (b) the lack of constraint.
Baetens et al. (2014) suggested that dmPFC involvement may
be a function of the required construal level of the stimuli.
According to construal level theory (CLT, Trope and Liberman,
2010), stimuli can be represented at different levels of abstraction
or construal, with a higher construal level preserving certain
central qualities (often conceptual, e.g., an aggressive trait)
of stimuli (e.g., specific behaviors such as hitting, hurting,
criticizing), while disregarding inessential, low-level features
(often perceptual, e.g., whether physical force was used or not).
This is not a process of mere information loss because high
construal levels make the relations between stimuli more salient
(e.g., very diverse behaviors can be classified as aggressive).
Using functional imaging, Baetens et al. (2014) found support
for the association between high construal level and increased
dmPFC activation. Importantly, they found stronger dmPFC
activation not only for social stimuli as illustrated above, but
also for non-social stimuli (e.g., means of transportation as a
higher-level construal of a car, boat, or train). In their study,
Baetens et al. (2014) presented pictures of an object or an
actor engaged in everyday behaviors. In the high construal
condition for persons, participants inferred traits from the
depicted behavior. In the high construal condition for objects,
they generated superordinate categories for visually presented
objects (completions of the sentence “this is an example of ...,”
see Wakslak and Trope, 2009). For instance, by categorizing “a
dog” as “an animal,” participants tend to focus on high-level
superordinate aspects and disregard low-level attributes like tail,
fur, etcetera. In low construal conditions regarding both persons
and objects, participants generated visual descriptions regarding
color, shape, structure, and texture of the same pictures. The
dmPFC and other parts of the mentalizing network were
significantly more active in the high than in the low construal
tasks, both for object and person pictures.
This result raises the question why and to what extent high
construal instructions induce dmPFC activation across a variety
of domains. One possibility is that the dmPFC is predominantly
involved in social processes, such as judgments about the self
and others (Northoff et al., 2006; Denny et al., 2012). These
judgments typically entail high construals: abstract qualities like
preferences, traits, or opinions of the actor, which are mental
rather than directly perceivable. The social brain hypothesis
(Dunbar, 1998, 2003) suggests that this social abstraction
function developed early during human evolution due to greater
demands enforced by living in increasingly large social groups
that facilitate cooperation and hence survival. Subsequently, this
abstraction function may have been re-used and extended to
facilitate categorization of an increasing variety and complexity
of other objects, including objects from human (e.g., tools) or
biological nature (e.g., food) which are essential in production
and foraging. Indeed, a direct comparison between social and
non-social high construal judgments in Baetens et al. (2014)
revealed a stronger activation of the dmPFC in social high
construals. Likewise, Moran et al. (2011) found greater dmPFC
activation in judgments of character (social) vs. appearance (non-
social) of self and others. Obviously, this explanation predicts
dmPFC involvement in abstract tasks without mentalizing
content as well.
While the findings of the study by Baetens et al. (2014)
are consistent with this account, it is possible that the higher
dmPFC activation in high vs. low construal is actually driven by
differences in task constraint (i.e., the extent to which the task
context guided the cognitive process). Prior research documented
stronger dmPFC activation in the comparison of free vs. rule-
governed choice (Brass and Haggard, 2007; Rowe et al., 2008),
during mind-wandering (Mason et al., 2007b) and internally
guided or self-generated thought (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014).
For example, in a study on free vs. rule governed choice (Rowe
et al., 2008), the comparison of free choice (e.g., freely select one
of four buttons) with rule-governed choice (e.g., press button
designated by arrow) yielded activation of the dmPFC. In a
subsequent experiment, prior to the presentation of a stimulus
array, participants were prompted either to apply a forced rule
to the subsequent display (e.g., indicate the location of the
visually darkest stimulus) or to freely choose between two rules
(e.g., choose to either indicate the location of the darkest or
the lightest stimulus in the subsequent presentation). Again,
dmPFC activation was associated with the unconstrained process
of voluntary rule selection as opposed to the more constrained
process of rule application. One could argue that in the study by
Baetens et al. (2014), the visual (low construal) task was much
more constrained than the categorization (high construal) task.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 44
Baetens et al. dmPFC in High Construal
That is, in the visual task, participants could employ a systematic
guiding strategy to describe the pictures (e.g., scan visually and
describe color, shape, texture, structure), while such constraining
strategy was unavailable in the categorization task of the
pictures.
In the present study, we tried to replicate the impact of
construal level on dmPFC activation, while investigating the
potential influence of constraint. To this end, we manipulated
construal level and constraint independently within one
experiment. The design (Figure 1) was an extension of Baetens
et al. (2014). First, in a replication of this prior study, we
manipulated construal level by asking participants to either
categorize (high construal) or visually describe (low construal)
pictures of objects (manmade objects, animals, and natural
phenomena). As noted earlier, categorizations (i.e., finding
completions for the sentence “This is an example of...”)
prompt higher construals of stimuli than visual descriptions
(Wakslak and Trope, 2009). Second, as a novel manipulation,
we implemented a low vs. high constraint level of the task.
However, a straightforward application or extension of earlier
constraint manipulations is impossible, because we request in
all conditions to follow some rule to manipulate construal level
(i.e., visual vs. categorical judgment). Therefore, we decided
to render the application of this rule itself more or less
constrained. In low constraint trials, we asked participants to
freely generate categories or visual characteristics pertaining
to only one picture. In contrast, in high constraint trials,
they performed the same task for two pictures at once, with
the constraint that their categorizations or visual descriptions
had to match between the two pictures. Thus, the number
of possible answers was strictly smaller in high than in low
constraint trials. Further, the number of visual or conceptual
correspondences between the stimuli was limited, while one
commonality was highlighted, reducing the search space. Note
that this implementation of constraint is more subtle than
in prior research, and might therefore potentially remain
undetected.
If dmPFC activity is triggered by a greater required construal
level (i.e., abstraction), this should lead to stronger dmPFC
involvement in high construal (category) vs. low construal
(visual), regardless of constraint. Alternatively, if dmPFC
activation is driven by self-guided, unconstrained processes, we
would expect stronger involvement in low (generate) than in high
(match) constraint conditions, regardless of construal level.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the four trial types.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and a
normal neurological history.
Ten women and nine men, right-handed, with ages between
19 and 51 (M = 26) participated in exchange for e10. One other
participant was excluded due to excessive movement artifacts
(detailed below). This study was carried out in accordance with
the recommendations of Medical Ethics Committee at the Ghent
University Hospital and the Brussels University Hospital with
written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the Medical Ethics
Committees at the Ghent University Hospital and the Brussels
University Hospital.
Stimulus Material
The pictures depicted everyday manmade objects or structures
(e.g., a chair), non-manmade objects, such as animals (e.g.,
a cow), plants, or parts thereof (e.g., a leaf), and natural
phenomena or structures (e.g., a mountain), all on a white
background. The whole stimulus set consisted of 120 images. All
images were cropped to 348 × 522 pixels and presented side by
side. Figure 1 shows example pictures.
The images consisted of 60 pairs of pictures. Perceptual
pairs (n = 30) shared at least one visual characteristic: color
or color pattern (e.g., black-and-white), shape or structure
(e.g., round), or texture (e.g., fluffy). Conceptual pairs
(n = 30) shared at least one common semantic category.
In the high constraint conditions, conceptual or perceptual
pairs were presented together as just described. In the
low constraint conditions, we presented pseudo-random
combinations of the images, as detailed in the experimental
procedure below.
Experimental Procedure
Each trial consisted of a fixation cross (2 s), variable 0–2 s of
jitter, an instruction (2 s), two pictures depicting one object
each (7 s), a difficulty rating question and finally a verification
probe, both of which remained on screen until participants
responded (see Figure 2 for an overview of the presentation
procedure). The instructions informed participants whether they
were to categorize or describe the pictures during the next trial
(construal level manipulation), and whether they had to take
only one or both pictures into account simultaneously (constraint
manipulation). In the latter case, they were informed whether
they had to perform the task on the left or the right image (50%
each, randomly determined).
We manipulated construal level independently from
constraint, resulting in 4 trial types. In the low construal/high
constraint trials, we presented perceptual pairs. Participants
generated as many as possible visual characteristics (color,
texture, shape, or structure) that applied to both presented
objects. Participants were explicitly asked not to generate
subjective or evaluative descriptions or interpretations. In the
high construal/high constraint trials, we presented conceptual
pairs, and participants generated as many categories as possible
to which both depicted objects belonged. As an aid, they were told
to generate sentence completions of “These are an example of...,”
in line with Wakslak and Trope’s (2009) manipulation to prime
a high construal mindset. They were told that subcategories of
previously generated categories (e.g., “mammal” after “animal”),
were considered valid, but categories based on visual features
(e.g., “yellow things”) or on subjective grounds (e.g., “ugly
things”) were not.
In the low constraint conditions, there were also two pictures
on screen to keep the visual input equivalent. Participants
performed the same task, but were instructed to take only the
picture on the left or on the right of the screen into consideration,
as indicated in the instructions and by a black frame around
FIGURE 2 | Structure of an example trial.
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the relevant picture during stimulus presentation (see Figure 1).
In the low construal/low constraint trials, participants freely
generated as many visual characteristics of the target object as
possible. In the high construal/low constraint trials, participants
generated categories for the single target object. To avoid
participants performing the same judgment (describing or
categorizing) on the same picture twice in the course of the
experiment, the target picture in the low construal/low constraint
condition was randomly selected from the conceptual pairs in
the high construal/high constraint condition. The target picture
in high construal/low constraint condition was selected from
the perceptual pairs. Non-target pictures were randomly selected
from the remaining images.
In all conditions, participants were requested to generate
responses during the entire 7 s stimulus presentation. There were
30 trials per condition, all presented in a fully random order.
After stimulus presentation, each trial, participants rated task
difficulty on a four-point scale (1 = very easy, 2 = rather easy,
3 = rather difficult, 4 = very difficult), by pressing one of four
buttons on a response box below their left hand. There was
no time limit for responding to this question. Following this
difficulty judgment, participants were presented a verification
probe, a category or visual feature that was clearly applicable
or inapplicable to the picture(s) that had just been presented
(50% each, in every condition), as determined at face value.
Participants indicated whether they had thought of this category
or feature during the trial, providing a behavioral performance
measure.
Participants performed 10 practice trials inside the scanner
before the start of the experiment to allow them to get used to
the experimental environment.
Practice Procedure
Prior to the experiment in the scanner, participants performed
the experimental tasks out loud in the presence of the first
author. They received feedback on how well they followed
the instructions. When participants performed all the tasks
correctly, they were asked whether they felt confident about their
performance. When they expressed confidence, we proceeded to
the actual experiment. Otherwise, additional training trials were
provided. Participants were informed that the tasks in the scanner
were identical, save that they were to be performed silently, as to
avoid motion artifacts.
Imaging Procedure
We collected images with a 3 T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany), and an
8-channel radiofrequency head coil. Participants could see the
monitor display projected on a screen at the end of the scanner
bore by means of a mirror on the head coil. For stimulus
presentation, we used E-Prime 2.0 software (www.pstnet.com/
eprime; Psychology Software Tools). In order to provide comfort
and minimize movement artifacts, we placed foam cushions
inside the head coil. After acquisition of a high resolution T1-
weighted structural scan (MP-RAGE), there was one functional
run featuring a gradient-echo echoplanar pulse sequence (EPIs;
30 axial slices; 4 mm thick; 1 mm skip; TR= 2 s; TE= 33 ms; 3.5
× 3.5× 4.0 mm in-plane resolution).
Image Processing and Statistical Analysis
The fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed with SPM8
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London).
Preprocessing involved (1) slice timing correction, (2)
realignment to correct for head movement, (3) coregistration
of the participant’s high resolution anatomical data to their
mean EPI, (4) normalization into standard MNI space (rescaled
to 2 × 2 × 2 mm isotropic voxels) based on the ICBM 152
brain template (Montreal Neurological Institute), and (5) spatial
smoothing (6× 6× 6 mm full-width at half maximum Gaussian
kernel).
Next, we used the Artifact Detection Tool software package
(ART; http://web.mit.edu/swg/art/art.pdf; http://www.nitrc.org/
projects/artifact_detect) to remove excessive motion artifacts and
control for correlations between movement parameters or global
mean signal and the experimental design. To detect movement
outliers, between-scan differences in a temporal difference series
were assessed using a Z-threshold of 3, a scan to scan movement
threshold of 0.45 mm and a rotation threshold of 0.02 rad.
Based on this analysis, one participant was excluded from
further analysis, resulting in a final total of 9 male and 10
female participants. There were no problematic correlations
between movement parameters or global mean signal and the
experimental design.
The statistical analysis entailed two levels. First, we estimated
the single-subject effects using a general linear model, using a
canonical response function and a 128 s high-pass filter. The
first level analysis modeled the effects of the four conditions
of interest, time-locked at the presentation onset of each
picture pair, and using an event duration of 7 s (the time
allotted to generate responses). Identical analyses using an
event duration of 0 s focusing on the onset of the stimulus
presentation are reported in the Supplementary Materials
(Table S1). Further, the first level model included several
nuisance regressors: 6 motion parameter estimations from
the realignment procedure as well as an additional regressor
for each movement outlier (as identified by ART). Serial
correlations were accounted for by the default auto-regressive
AR(1) model.
To investigate group-level effects, we conducted a repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the parameter
estimates associated with each trial type, with Constraint
(generate vs. match) and Construal Level (visual vs. category)
as within-participants factors, including a participants factor
to account for between-participant variance. To account
for variance explained by differences in difficulty between
conditions, we included a covariate with the mean difficulty
rating per participant per condition (overall mean centered,
no interactions specified). Comparisons of interest were
implemented as linear contrasts using a random-effects model.
As a main effect of either Construal Level or Constraint could
be due to one of both individual conditions that made up each
factor (e.g., effects of Construal level might be observed under
low or high constraint, or both), we conducted conjunction
analyses (conjunction null) to identify regions more active in
high than low construal, regardless of constraint and vice versa.
An uncorrected threshold of p ≤ 0.001 and a minimum cluster
size of 10 rescaled (2 × 2 × 2 mm) voxels were used for this
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whole-brain analysis, followed up by a peak level FWE-corrected
threshold of p ≤ 0.05.
Lastly, to identify brain regions showing activation as a linear
function of the difficulty rating across conditions, we conducted
a separate two-level analysis. At the single-subject level, all trials
were modeled as belonging to one and the same condition, with
the difficulty rating for each trial as a parametric modulator.
We tested for group-level effects by means of one sample t-
tests (testing for significantly positive and negative slopes of
the parametric modulator), treating participant as a random
effect and using the same statistical thresholds as described
above.
Analysis of Behavioral Data
The statistical analysis of the behavioral measures (difficulty
ratings and probe acceptance data) involved repeated measures
ANOVAs with the same within-participant factors as the whole-
brain imaging analysis.
RESULTS
Behavioral Measures
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the performance
measures. A repeated measures ANOVA on the difficulty ratings
with Constraint and Construal Level as within-participant factors
revealed a significant main effect of Constraint, F(1, 18) = 12.75,
p < 0.01 and a significant interaction between Constraint and
Construal Level, F(1, 18) = 7.49, p< 0.05. Post-hoc paired samples
t-tests indicated that the difficulty ratings in both high constraint
conditions were significantly higher than in their low constraint
counterparts (ps < 0.05).
With respect to the verification probes, recall that these
queried whether participants had thought of an (experimenter-
provided) plausible or implausible category or feature during
the trial. Participants rejected implausible probes in on average
98% of the trials, suggesting that they performed the task well
(Table 1). A repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant
differences between conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA
on the proportion of accepted plausible probes per condition
revealed a significant main effect of Constraint [F(1, 18) =
73.78, p < 0.001], Construal Level [F(1, 18) = 7.33, p < 0.05],
and their interaction [F(1, 18) = 4.78, p < 0.05]. Overall,
this pattern is quite similar to that of the difficulty ratings.
To enable direct visual comparison between the difficulty
ratings and plausible probe acceptance, we standardized these
variables by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard
deviation across conditions per participant. The results are
displayed in Figure 3 (all statistical analyses were carried out on
raw data).
As a manipulation check to verify that participants followed
the instructions, we computed two correlations. First, comparing
between participants, we found a negative correlation between
overall mean task difficulty (across conditions) and mean
plausible probe acceptance (across conditions) per participant
(r=−0.56, p < 0.05). This provides convergent validity for these
measures: participants who found the task difficult, considered,
and generated plausible probes less often and vice versa. On
the other hand, comparing between conditions (see Figure 3),
we found a significant positive correlation between difficulty
rating and plausible probe acceptance (mean across participants
r = 0.30, p < 0.05). The more difficult a condition was judged,
themore frequently participants had generated the experimenter-
provided plausible probes in these conditions. Most likely, this is
because there were, as intended, less plausible answers in these
difficult (i.e., high constraint) conditions.
fMRI Data
The whole-brain analysis revealed a main effect of Construal
on dmPFC activation, while there was no such main effect of
Constraint, nor an interaction with Construal Level. Because
taking up task difficulty as a covariate of no interest could bias
the results toward or against one of the hypotheses regarding the
involvement of the dmPFC, we replicated the analysis without
FIGURE 3 | Relationship between difficulty rating and plausible probe
acceptance.
TABLE 1 | Behavioral data per condition (N = 19).
Low constraint High constraint
Low construal High construal Low construal High construal
Difficulty rating: Mean (SD) 1.86 (0.29) 2.05 (0.35) 2.16 (0.39) 2.18 (0.39)
Implausible probes accepted (SD) 4% (7%) 0% (2%) 4% (7%) 1% (3%)
Plausible probes accepted (SD) 54% (14%) 66% (17%) 84% (12%) 85% (8%)
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this covariate. The results regarding the dmPFC were identical:
only in the comparison of high vs. low construal did we find
significant activation in this region.
Although, there was no significant interaction in dmPFC
activation, to ensure that the significant main effect of Construal
was not driven by one of the (high or low) constraint conditions,
we computed conjunction analyses of the high vs. low construal
conditions across the Constraint factor, and likewise of the high
vs. low constraint conditions across the Construal factor (see
Table 2 and Figure 4). Under these more stringent conditions,
too, we found significantly stronger activation in the dmPFC
in high vs. low construal level conditions, as well as in the
ventromedial PFC, middle temporal gyrus, parahippocampal
gyrus, precuneus angular gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, and
cerebellum.
Like in the study by Baetens et al. (2014), the reported dmPFC
activation was rather left of the midline. The area typically
involved in mentalizing tasks according to Van Overwalle and
Baetens’ meta-analysis (2009) is centered at the midline, around
MNI coordinates 0, 50, 35. To explore whether this region
was also more active in the high than low construal level
conditions, within the conjunction contrast we performed a
small volume correction analysis within a 6 mm sphere around
these coordinates. This yielded significant activation (MNI −4,
TABLE 2 | Results of conjunction analyses (vs. null), all at threshold p < 0.05 (FWE-corrected, number of voxels ≥ 10), trial duration 7 s.
Contrast Anatomical region MNI coordinates
BA x y z t k
High construal > Low construal (for both levels of constraint) Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 9 −8 52 38 4.85 434
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 11 −6 36 −20 5.35 246
Superior frontal gyrus 8 −30 16 56 5.48 860
Middle temporal gyrus 21 −48 −12 −22 5.33 419
Parahippocampal gyrus 30 −14 −46 4 6.02* 1,722a
Precuneus (inferior) 31 −10 −60 22 6.7* 1,722a
Angular gyrus 39 −42 −64 30 5.79* 782b
39 54 −66 34 6.12* 318c
39 52 −66 42 5.81* 318c
39 −48 −72 38 6.79** 782b
Inferior parietal lobule 7 −42 −74 46 6.10* 782b
Cerebellum 16 −86 −34 5.79* 394
Low construal > High construal (for both levels of constraint) Inferior frontal gyrus 9 52 10 32 7.04** 921d
44 50 10 24 6.67** 921d
9 −46 6 30 8.56** 1,889e
Superior frontal gyrus 6 −24 0 62 8.46** 1,889e
6 26 0 58 7.61** 778
Middle frontal gyrus 6 −24 −4 52 8.03** 1,889e
Superior parietal lobule 7 −24 −60 58 9.76** 9,055f
7 26 −68 42 10.42** 9,100g
Precuneus (superior) 7 24 −60 54 10.29** 9,100g
7 −24 −68 38 11.47** 9,055f
Precuneus (superior) 7 −20 −68 50 10.18** 9,055f
Inferior temporal gyrus 37 54 −62 −8 10.24** 100
Cerebellum 14 −70 −44 5.55 44
Inferior parietal lobule 40 −34 −46 54 10.01**
Middle temporal gyrus 37 −46 −64 2 10.22**
Low constraint > High constraint (for both levels of construal) No significant clusters
High constraint > Low constraint (for both levels of construal) Lingual gyrus 18 −10 −76 −2 13.05** 15,838h
Cuneus 17 12 −80 6 12.05** 15,838h
18 −8 −88 10 11.67** 15,838h
Middle frontal gyrus 9 48 26 38 5.64
46 48 32 28 5.60
BA, Brodmann’s Area; L and R, left and right hemispheres; t, t-score at those coordinates (peak value); k, cluster size (in voxels). Regions with ks that share a superscript originate from
the same cluster. Activations in bold are only significant in the model including difficulty as a covariate of no interest; activations in italics are only significant without including difficulty as
a covariate of no interest. *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001 (FWE-corrected).
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FIGURE 4 | Conjunction analyses. (A) Conjunction of both high construal level > both low construal level conditions (orange) and both low construal level > both
high construal level conditions (blue). (B) Conjunction of both high constraint > both low constraint conditions (green) and both low constraint > both high constraint
conditions (red). All uncorrected whole-brain threshold of p < 0.001, number of voxels > 10; trial duration 7 s and difficulty included as a covariate of no interest.
52, 38, t = 4.26, p < 0.01, FWE-corrected), confirming that the
mentalizing region in the dmPFC was also more involved in the
high than low construal level conditions in the present study.
The whole-brain conjunction analysis further revealed that
low construal was associated with more prominent activations
in the lateral frontal and parietal cortex, as well as the inferior
temporal cortex (Table 2). With respect to constraint, high
constraint was associated with activation in the visual cortex,
regardless the level of construal. No activations survived the
statistical threshold for low constraint.
Finally, to verify whether dmPFC activation was driven by
task difficulty, we identified brain regions in which activation
was a linear function of the difficulty rating over all experimental
conditions. This parametric analysis yielded no peaks surviving
the statistical threshold, and neither at a more lenient FDR-
corrected threshold. We performed a similar small volume
correction analysis within a 6mm sphere around the dmPFC, and
again found no significant activations.
DISCUSSION
Previous research has demonstrated dmPFC involvement in high
vs. low construal of both social and non-social stimuli (Baetens
et al., 2014). In this study, for non-social material, we explored
the possibility that this activation is modulated by the degree of
task constraint. However, we found no effect of constraint on
dmPFC activation, nor any significant interaction of this factor
with construal level. Instead, we found greater involvement of the
dmPFC given high as opposed to low construal, irrespective of
constraint, and subjective task difficulty. This result confirms that
higher construal recruits the dmPFC as revealed in prior work by
Baetens et al. (2014).
The proposal that the dmPFC subserves high construal
is consistent with its prominent role in abstract, social,
and affective processes which require the computation of
mental states. The crucial role of the dmPFC in mentalizing
(Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) and self or other-related
judgments (Northoff et al., 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009; Denny
et al., 2012) is understandable from this point of view, as
person judgment tasks typically feature relatively abstract (high
construal level) qualities. This is in line with an important
distinction within this domain, namely the relatively higher
dmPFC involvement in enduring (e.g., trait) than in temporary
(e.g., goal) person inferences (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009)
or in character than in appearance judgments (Moran et al.,
2011).
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Explaining the Role of the dmPFC in High
Construal
The finding of this study that high construal was observed for
non-social stimuli suggests that the dmPFC may subserve a
more general, underlying cognitive function that is particularly
important for social cognition as repeatedly demonstrated in
earlier research (Van Overwalle, 2009; Schurz et al., 2014), but
also potentially valuable in other contexts. This is consistent
with a related position recently put forward by Spunt and
Adolphs (2014), who argued that high construal might consist
of a set of processes that are part of our abilities to think about
the internal state of other people. This modular view allows
for the possibility that one of these processes computes high-
construal categories that are not observable but only exist in
one’s mind. This functional module may be profitable applied
in other non-social contexts for constructing and understanding
non-observable high-construals. Thus, unlike cars and boats,
transportation means as such cannot be observed in reality
or imagined vividly, but might nevertheless be constructed
internally on logical grounds (e.g., based a shared function).
This modular position is consistent with an evolutionary
view on social cognition mentioned earlier, which posits that
the brain’s expansion during human evolution was partly driven
by increasing pressure to maintain life-long relationships with
large numbers of conspecifics, requiring abstract judgments on
their qualities and traits to work and live together. Extending
this view, this abstraction function might have been re-used
for judging abstract qualities of non-social manmade (i.e.,
tools) or natural objects (i.e., food), and are crucial for
(communication about) production and nutrition so that their
abstract categorization becomes evolutionary advantageous. This
evolutionary trajectory is supported by research demonstrating
stronger dmPFC involvement in social as opposed to non-social
high construals (Baetens et al., 2014).
Alternative Interpretations
Nevertheless, several alternative accounts could explain the
pattern of dmPFC activation in the present study. One
possible explanation is that high construal relies on domain-
general semantic processes. Specifically, the dmPFC might be
“responsible for the context-dependent representation of, and
choice between, alternative lexical semantic interpretations” and
so contribute to a general executive system that “uses context
to relate external stimuli to specific internal representations
of knowledge about these stimuli” (Scott et al., 2003, p. 874).
Note that the reference to “internal representations” has some
similarity with the modular view of internal processes during
mentalizing mentioned earlier. A meta-analysis of over 120
studies by Binder et al. (2009), showed that the left dmPFC is
consistently more activated by processing the meaning of words
vs. their structural properties (i.e., phonology and orthography).
As high construals require disregard of low-level perceptual
features in favor of central qualities, there is a strong analogy
between high vs. low construal level and the processing of
meaning vs. structural properties of words. Other research
demonstrates that the dmPFC is involved in the creation of
new metaphors, arguably the pinnacles of abstract language
use (Benedek et al., 2014) and in coherence building during
discourse comprehension (Ferstl and von Cramon, 2001, 2002;
Siebörger et al., 2007; Ferstl et al., 2008), in which retrieval of
the proper level of abstraction is crucial for achieving coherence
(Ferstl and von Cramon, 2002). In conclusion, this alternative
account suggests that dmPFC activation in high construal
could be driven not by high construal itself, but by a demand
on semantic retrieval processes (i.e., choice between context-
dependent interpretations). It also dovetails nicely with greater
dmPFC involvement in improvising vs. reproducing of hip hop
lyrics (Liu et al., 2012) but not of an instrumental jazz solo (Limb
and Braun, 2008).
A second alternative explanation, also in line with a modular
account, views activation in cortical midline structures, and
the dmPFC in particular, as associated with internally focused
processes, as opposed to externally focused processes which
are associated with lateral (prefrontal) cortex activation (for
a review, see Lieberman, 2007; for a discussion regarding the
difference between constraint and internally oriented processes,
see Mason et al., 2007a). This distinction could explain
dmPFC involvement in the high construal conditions, because
as construal level increases, specific stimulus characteristics
(externally, perceptually available information) become less
important compared to relations with other stimuli (internally
represented information). However, experimental evidence
argues against the view that the internal-external orientation
per se is related to dmPFC activation in mentalizing, or more
generally in high construal. Several studies actually suggest the
inverse pattern: greater involvement of the medial dmPFC in
externally focused processes and of the lateral prefrontal cortex in
internally focused processes (Burgess et al., 2007; Henseler et al.,
2011). Critically, Gilbert et al. (2007) made a within-participants
comparison of mentalizing (performing a task supposedly with
a collaborator) vs. no mentalizing (no collaborator) on the one
hand, and externally vs. internally oriented processes on the
other, and found activations in dissociable parts of the dmPFC
related to mentalizing and internal orientation.
The present results are at odds with a previous study by Gilead
et al. (2014). Like Baetens et al. (2014), these authors attempted to
isolate regions involved in high vs. low construal level of persons
and objects. Two key findings emerged from the Gilead et al.
(2014) study. First, there was no significant activation in the
contrast of high vs. low construal level. This is inconsistent with
previous studies consistently revealing higher dmPFC activation
in the why vs. how contrast, using both verbal and visual stimuli
(Spunt et al., 2010, 2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012). Second,
contrary to our findings, there was significantly stronger dmPFC
activation in the exemplar (low construal level) than in the
category task (high construal level) for objects, although the
inverse was true for the why (high construal level) vs. how (low
construal level) task for persons. At present, we do not have a
satisfactory explanation for these discrepant findings.
Impact of Constraint
As previously outlined, we hypothesized that the activation of the
dmPFC in high compared to low construal (Baetens et al., 2014)
might have been driven by the less constrained nature of the high
construal conditions (i.e., they provide less of a clear-cut guiding
strategy and rely more heavily on self-guided processes). Based
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on this hypothesis, one might have expected stronger dmPFC
activation in low compared to high constraint in the present
study. Yet, we found no differences in dmPFC activation between
different levels of constraint. (Note that this holds not only for
the conjunction analysis, but for the individual conditions as
well, see Table S2). The comparison of low vs. high constraint
didn’t yield any significant activation differences, in the dmPFC
or elsewhere. Only the supplementary analysis, focusing on
the onset of the trial, did produce significant activation, in
the posterior cingulate cortex/retrosplenial cortex (BA30, see
Table S1)—previous investigations have implicated this region
in unconstrained (vs. constrained) processes before (Schubert
et al., 1999; Mason et al., 2007b; Soon et al., 2008). Conversely,
high constraint conditions were associated with greater occipital
activations (BA 17, 18) than low constraint conditions. Given the
involvement of these regions in horizontal saccade movements
(Darby et al., 1996), we believe these activationsmost likely reflect
the requirement to take two visual stimuli into account at the
same time in these conditions.
While we did not find the predicted impact of constraint
on dmPFC activation, it would be premature to rule out this
alternative account based on the present results. Specifically,
it is quite possible that our manipulation of constraint failed
because it was too subtle compared to previous studies, which
pitted totally free choices against fully determined rule-governed
decisions (e.g., Rowe et al., 2008). Further, it is conceivable that
the task to generate visual or categoricalmatches did not so much
constrain the generation process itself, but rather the selection
process amongst generated responses. That is, participants may
have generated categories or descriptions that applied to one
of the pictures under all conditions, but only applied a more
constrained selection process in matching these categories or
descriptions to the two pictures in the constrained condition.
Limitations
Several limitations of the present study must be addressed. First,
this study is prone to limited experimental control. Participants
were asked to engage in different cognitive processes, but as they
responded only covertly, it is difficult to verify their performance.
Nevertheless, manipulation checks—the verification probes (i.e.,
questions after each trial about possible categories or visual
features that participants had been thinking of)—seem to suggest
that participants complied with the instructions. Participants
practically always correctly rejected implausible probes, and the
plausible probes in more difficult trials (i.e., high constraint
conditions) resulted in greater acceptance of the experimenter-
provided answers. Further, participants who found the task
difficult, generated plausible probes less often by themselves.
Nevertheless, a crucial challenge for future research is to create
experimental designs enabling the study of high-level construal
processes, while at the same time achieving better experimental
control.
Second, differences in activation between construal level
conditions could be due to task difficulty. Specifically, as
participants had to generate responses during 7 s, perhaps they
spent a larger fraction of this period idly in the (more difficult)
high construal level conditions, because they couldn’t think
of any further responses. The greater dmPFC involvement in
the high construal level conditions could then reflect greater
default network activation (Gusnard et al., 2001). This network
encompasses regions often showing relatively high metabolic
activity in the absence of a specific task-directed context and
revealing a high overlap with brain areas involved in social
mentalizing (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). This account seems
unlikely given that a parametric analysis did not show any
relation between difficulty and dmPFC activation. Moreover,
there was no dmPFC activation in the comparison of high and
low constraint. As the number of possible correct responses was
strictly smaller in the high constraint conditions (as reflected
in the subjective difficulty ratings), it seems therefore highly
improbable that task difficulty differences underlie the dmPFC
involvement in high vs. low construal.
Lastly, as noted before, it is very well possible that our failure
to find any impact of constraint on dmPFC activation was
due to the more subtle nature of our constraint manipulation
compared to other studies. To gain accurate understanding of
the relation between task constraint and dmPFC activation, it
will be necessary to investigate a wider range of levels and
implementations of constraint in the future.
Conclusion
In the present study, we replicated earlier findings of stronger
dmPFC activation during high construal (generating categories)
than low construal (visual descriptions) of objects. We found
no impact whatsoever of the degree of constraint on activation
of the dmPFC. However, further research is needed to rule out
the possibility that this dmPFC involvement is due to lower
constraints inherent to the generation of categories (as opposed
to the description of visual properties).
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